More Clues as to the Nature of the Remedy for Breach of Trust: Creggy v Barnett [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 by Whayman D
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Whayman D.  
More Clues as to the Nature of the Remedy for Breach of Trust: Creggy v 
Barnett [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4.  
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 2017, (2), 139-146. 
 
Copyright: 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. in Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer on 01/04/2017. 
Journal URL link: 
http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/Catalogue/ProductDetails.aspx?recordid=333&productid=6598  
Date deposited:   
28/03/2017 
Embargo release date: 
01 April 2018  
  1 
More Clues as to the Nature of the Remedy for Breach of Trust 
Creggy v Barnett [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 
 
Derek Whayman, Newcastle University 
 
Published in [2017] Conv 139 
 
Subject: Trusts. 
Keywords: Breach of trust; equitable compensation; account; causation; limitation; 
acknowledgement of claim 
Cases: 
Creggy v Barnett [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 
Ex p. Adamson (1878) 8 Ch. D. 807 
Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] 1 A.C. 421 
AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] UKSC 58; [2015] A.C. 1503 
Abstract 
This note examines the nature of the remedy for the breach of trust that is the inadvertent paying 
away of trust property without authority, addressing the Target Holdings debate. The case of 
Creggy v Barnett, considering the rule that the acknowledgement of a debt and indeed a breach 
of trust can reset the limitation clock, sheds some light on the remedy. This note considers its 
origins as a restitutionary measure and, in line with other developments, argues its future is 
compensatory. 
Introduction 
What is the nature of the remedy for the breach of trust that is the inadvertent paying away of 
trust property without authority? Until Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns1 it was thought to be 
the simple reconstitution (or restitution) of the trust absent the features of compensation such 
as remoteness and causation: Re Dawson.2 Yet causation was applied to reduce quantum in 
Target Holdings and that case was affirmed in AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler & Co 
Solicitors.3 
The precise nature of the remedy is not entirely clear. Assisting matters are the judgments 
in Creggy v Barnett,4 where the Court of Appeal made a number of obiter dicta about the 
remedy. This addresses the debate as to whether Target Holdings and AIB are correct and if it 
is legitimate to view the remedy as compensatory and, unlike account and debt, subject to 
causation.5 
                                                 
1 [1996] 1 A.C. 421. 
2 [1966] 2 N.S.W.R. 211. 
3 [2014] UKSC 58; [2015] A.C. 1503 at [53]. 
4 [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4. 
5 See, e.g., C. Mitchell, “Stewardship of Property and Liability to Account” [2014] Conv. 215; M. Conaglen, 
“Explaining Target Holdings v Redferns” (2010) 4 J. Eq. 288; P.J. Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of 
Commerce” (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 214; P.S. Davies, “Compensatory Remedies for Breach of Trust” (2016) 2 
C.J.C.C.L. 65, 76; and J. Edelman, “Money Awards of the Cost of Performance” (2010) 4 J. Eq. 122, 131. 
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Creggy v Barnett was concerned with the acknowledgement rule, which resets the limitation 
clock when one acknowledges a debt. The majority of the Court held that it applied to equitable 
compensation for that kind of breach of trust. The whole Court held it did not to breach of 
fiduciary duty.6 However, the Court did not distinguish between situations where Target 
Holdings applies and where it does not. It further did not engage with the newer terminology 
of substitutive and reparative compensation. This note aims to take these matters further. 
It is argued that the rule will apply to both situations. It is further argued that, on the face of 
it, the additional historic materials revealed by Creggy support the proposition that the remedy 
is simple reconstitution. This is in line with the familiar dictum uttered by James and Baggallay 
L.JJ. in Ex p. Adamson: 
“The suit was always for an equitable debt or liability in the nature of debt. It was a suit for 
the restitution of the actual money or thing, or value of the thing, of which the cheated party 
had been cheated.”7 
This has been relied on to support the proposition that causation does not apply to breach of 
trust because it does not to debt. It is suggested that a reason for the comparison in that dictum 
is because of the judge-made law that converted an equitable obligation to reconstitute a trust, 
upon acknowledgement, into a legal debt. Accordingly, the two were indeed seen as equivalent. 
Ultimately, however, the direction of travel of the cases, old and new, is against this. This 
pushes the remedy – substitutive compensation – to one that is compensatory, albeit it is a 
peculiar form of compensation that excludes consequential losses. 
Creggy v Barnett and the Applicable Circumstances 
The wrongdoing in Creggy v Barnett was the transfer in 1998 by Mr Creggy of some US$1.2m 
of company money. The companies, established by Mr Creggy, were used by the claimants, 
the Barnett brothers, for tax avoidance purposes. The claimants were the beneficial owners of 
the companies. Mr Creggy controlled the relevant funds and was responsible for ensuring they 
were applied to the claimants’ order and, in the meantime, was under a duty to preserve the 
funds in the companies’ bank accounts. At first instance, David Richards J held that the transfer 
was unauthorised. Since Mr Creggy owed fiduciary duties due to his position as a signatory, 
this was a breach of fiduciary duty. However, since the funds were not held on trust at the 
relevant time, there could be no claim over a “pre-existing beneficial interest”. Instead, the 
judge assessed equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty in the sum of US$1.2m.8 
A defence based on the reflective loss principle was rejected at first instance and was not 
subject to appeal. Mr Creggy’s other defence was of limitation. Mr Creggy, as constructive 
trustee, came within the Limitation Act 1980, s.21 via s.68(17), providing a six-year limitation 
period. Since the cause of action accrued in mid-1998, by 2012 the claim was out of time. The 
claimants’ answer was that a letter written in 2006 acknowledging the claim reset the limitation 
clock.9 
                                                 
6 On the distinction, see Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch. 1. 
7 (1878) 8 Ch. D. 807 at 819. 
8 [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [1]–[8]. No claim for a constructive trust for breach of fiduciary 
duty was apparently made. 
9 [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [9]. 
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Section 29(5) of the Act provides that: 
“where any right of action has accrued to recover … any debt or other liquidated pecuniary 
claim … and the person liable or accountable for the claim acknowledges the claim … the 
right shall be treated as having accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or 
payment.” 
The judge accepted the letter amounted to acknowledgement and the claim for equitable 
compensation fell within the definition of “any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim”. What 
was required was the “amount being known or being capable of straightforward calculation on 
the evidence”10 rather than the remedy being liquidated as a matter of principle. Since the claim 
was for the fixed sum paid away, it engaged the acknowledgement rule and the claim succeeded 
at first instance.11 
Etherton M.R., Patten and Sales L.JJ. unanimously allowed the appeal on the latter issue 
and it was therefore unnecessary to deal with the former. The Court of Appeal adopted a 
definition of liquidated sum requiring it to be ascertainable as a “reasonable price” under a 
contract or “a sum which can be readily and precisely ascertained” “pursuant to some 
contractual or similar obligation”.12 While a quantum meruit was within the section (approving 
Lagos v Grunwaldt13 and Phillips & Co v Bath Housing Co-operative Ltd),14 compensation for 
breach of fiduciary duty, which requires determination much like damages, could not be 
described as liquidated.15 Similarly, damages for negligence are outside the section.16 
Consequently, the clock was not restarted and the claim was time-barred. Provided one accepts 
the test for ascertainability is not on the evidence of the instant case and is instead on the kind 
of remedy in principle – in order to deal with the general case – the reasoning appears 
inescapable. 
However, the Court of Appeal went on to consider, obiter dictum, whether equitable 
compensation for the breach of trust of paying away trust money without authorisation engaged 
s.29(5)(a). The Court divided. Etherton M.R. held that such a claim was within the section as 
did Sales L.J. 17 Patten L.J. held that it was not.18 The applicable circumstances where this 
matters are thus a breach of trust absent a breach of fiduciary duty, i.e. the breach must be 
inadvertent. It is this situation the legal analysis in this note is concerned with. 
History of the Acknowledgement Rule 
The Court traced the history of the rules governing acknowledgement. The 1980 Act 
consolidated the Limitation Act 1939 and the substantive change was made in the 1939 Act 
replacing, inter alia, the Trustee Act 1888, s.8, which governed limitation against trustees. 
Particularly, it codified the judge-made rules for acknowledgement.19 The judge-made rules 
encompassed both debts entirely at common law and the obligations of trustees to reconstitute 
                                                 
10 [2014] EWHC 3080 (Ch); [2015] P.N.L.R. 13 at [107]. 
11 [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [10]–[12]. 
12 [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [30]–[31]. 
13 [1910] 1 K.B. 41. 
14 [2012] EWCA Civ 1591, [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1479 at [47]. 
15 Creggy [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [35], [46], [55]. 
16 Dwr Cymru Cyf v Carmarthenshire County Council [2004] EWHC 2991 (TCC). 
17 [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [43], [48] respectively. 
18 [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [34]. 
19 Creggy [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [14]; e.g. Edwards v Lowndes (1852) 1 El. & Bl. 81 at 
89; 118 E.R. 367 at 370; noted in Bullen & Leake’s Precedents of Pleadings, 2nd edn (London: Stevens, 1863), 
p.38 (Creggy at [21])). 
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trusts, which, upon acknowledgement, became actionable at law. They provided that the 
limitation clock was started or restarted upon that acknowledgement. 
The Trustee Act 1888, s.8 required the courts to determine if a claim for breach of trust was 
time-barred by applying the rules, including the judge-made acknowledgement rules, by 
analogy: “as if the claim had been against him in an action of debt for money had and received” 
(emphasis added). “Debt for money had and received” was thought to be the closest analogy 
to the legal liability a trustee was subject to under the judge-made law for acknowledgement.20 
Upon acknowledgement, the trustee in effect admitted that he held the trust monies to his own 
use, which gave rise to legal liability for debt in indebitatus assumpsit (whereunder money had 
and received also fell), which in turn engaged section 8. 
Conversely, the Limitation Act 1939, s.23(4), like the Limitation Act 1980, s.29(5), has no 
such phraseology, simply requiring a “debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim”. The difficulty 
was whether such a claim would be subject to the acknowledgement rule under the 1939 and 
1980 Acts, given the removal of the route via analogy, presumably because of “belated tidying 
up following … the abolition of the old forms of action”.21 It was on this the Court divided. 
Patten L.J. thought not. The consequence of the 1939 Act, for him, was that since the 
analogical link had been broken, the words of the statute had to be applied plainly. Since 
“[t]here is nothing in this to support giving the phrase ‘debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim’ 
a wide enough meaning so as to encompass claims for equitable compensation”,22 he held that 
claims for the breach of trust of paying away trust property without authorisation were not 
within the acknowledgement rule. Conversely, Sales L.J. and Etherton M.R. gave precedence 
to the principle that in consolidating Acts such as the 1939 Act, if there is any real doubt as to 
an ambiguous provision’s meaning, it should be presumed there was no intention to change the 
law.23 Accordingly, such claims would be subject to the acknowledgement rule. Sales L.J. also 
considered that it would be anomalous to exclude them, where claims in unjust enrichment and 
for set contractual amounts were included.24 
Substitutive and Reparative Compensation 
Not being in issue, the Court of Appeal did not develop this point further. But what more can 
be gleaned about the claim and remedy? One preliminary matter is the conceptual distinction 
between substitutive and reparative compensation. The Court did not use the terms reparative 
compensation and substitutive compensation but they were accepted in AIB,25 which falls 
within the applicable circumstances, as does Target Holdings. 
The distinction originates in these remedies’ roots in the process and action of account. 
Reparative compensation is the alternative to taking an account on the basis of wilful default. 
This requires the pleading and proof of the misconduct, and the remedy is for wider 
compensation akin to damages.26 The remedy also applies to breach of fiduciary duty. For 
                                                 
20 Creggy [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [21], citing Re Somerset [1894] 1 Ch. 231 at 255. 
21 Creggy [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [28]. 
22 Creggy [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [34]. 
23 Creggy [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [41]–[45] and [49]–[54] respectively. 
24 Creggy [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [45]. 
25 [2014] UKSC 58; [2015] A.C. 1503 at [53]. 
26 Libertarian Investments Ltd v Hall [2013] HKCFA 93, (2013) 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 681 at [170] (Lord Millett 
N.P.J.) 
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breach of fiduciary duty the form of account taken does not matter but similarly misconduct 
must be pleaded and proven.27 
Contrast that with substitutive compensation, which is the alternative to taking an account 
in common form. Here, one does not need to plead or prove wrongdoing.28 An account is taken 
and the unauthorised disbursement falsified. The trustee must then make good the account by 
returning the property or paying its money substitute. But how is that substitute quantified? 
Ordinarily, for traditional trusts, quantum is the value of the property lost with no further 
inquiry as to limiting principles such as causation. But in a “Target Holdings situation”, i.e. if 
a bare, commercial trust is no longer on foot and has “in practical terms been completed, 
leaving no active obligations for the trustee to perform”,29 the principle of causation does apply. 
It has been made clear by the Supreme Court that quantum is capped by actual losses caused 
by the breach.30 Moreover, it is inherent that consequential losses form no part of this sum 
because of its basis, looking only to reconstituting the account by replacing the value lost and 
not to wider matters.31 Contrast that with reparative compensation for wrongs such a failure to 
invest or use reasonable care and skill. These necessarily take in wider – consequential – losses. 
The conceptual difference is thus clear. 
The assumed facts of Target Holdings illustrate how this matters. There, a finance house 
paid £1.5m to its solicitor as financing for a property transaction. As is usual, the monies were 
held on bare trust. In a merely technical breach of trust (assumed to be devoid of dishonesty),32 
the mortgage charge was obtained after, rather than before, paying the monies, but before any 
material change in circumstances. Upon the mortgagor’s insolvency, the claimant realised only 
£500,000 on the sale of the property, nothing like its fraudulent valuation of £2m. Simple 
reconstitution of the trust would have meant that £1m would have had to have been paid. 
However, since the trust was no longer on foot and there was no causal link to the loss, quantum 
was zero. 
Nonetheless, the proposition that substitutive compensation admits causation and is 
therefore primary compensatory, not restitutionary, is controversial. The law revealed in 
Creggy can help explore this matter. Applying these terms to what the majority of the Court of 
Appeal said yields the following. Reparative compensation is not subject to the 
acknowledgement rule, but substitutive compensation for breach of trust is, although the Court 
did not distinguish between Target Holdings and non-Target Holdings situations. 
By considering the requirements and justifications for the acknowledgement rule, one can 
see how they influence the content of substitutive compensation. We begin with the judgments 
and proceed further into legal history. 
A Liquidated Pecuniary Claim 
Whether substitutive compensation is a “liquidated pecuniary claim”, as required by the 
Limitation Act 1980, s.29(5), is the easiest question to answer: yes, despite Patten L.J.’s view. 
The section is, as Etherton M.R. said, “capable of being fairly interpreted to include claims for 
                                                 
27 Glazier v Australian Men’s Health (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 6 [43]. 
28 Libertarian Investments [2013] HKCFA 93, (2013) 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 681 at [167] (Lord Millett N.P.J.) 
29 AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] UKSC 58; [2015] A.C. 1503 at [106]. 
30 AIB [2014] UKSC 58; [2015] A.C. 1503 at [62], [93]. 
31 S.B. Elliott, “Remoteness Criteria in Equity” (2002) 65 M.L.R. 588, 590. 
32 In reality the transaction was highly suspicious and redolent of fraud: [1996] 1 A.C. 421 at 440–1.  
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recovery of trust money [or] other trust assets wrongly misapplied”.33 Outside a Target 
Holdings situation, this is very clear. It is a fixed, ascertained sum, which is surely within any 
definition of liquidated sum. Compensation here is just a procedural alternative to account.34 
The difficulty is in a Target Holdings situation where quantum may vary. It is suggested 
that this too should fall within the section. In these circumstances quantification is analogous 
to that in a claim for a quantum meruit, which has been held to be within the section. In common 
with a quantum meruit, substitutive compensation does not reach consequential losses; rather 
it is “a sum which can be readily and precisely ascertained” despite the complication that one 
may have to have recourse to market rates in calculating it. A wide construction of “liquidated” 
has been adopted, at least in respect of the statute. If justifiable, it should therefore apply 
broadly. It is justifiable on the basis that both claims comprise a self-contained single-issue 
enquiry excluding consequential losses. Therefore, even though the majority did not expressly 
say that the Target Holdings situation would be included in the current law of 
acknowledgement, there is a good argument that it indeed would be. 
In the Nature of Debt 
Whether substitutive compensation is “in the nature of debt”, supporting the dictum in Ex p. 
Adamson – and therefore causation should not apply to substitutive claims – is more difficult 
to say. Here is where the history of the acknowledgement rule assists. 
As noted, in the days of the forms of action, both money had and received and debt fell 
under the same action: indebitatus assumpsit. Liability “in the nature of a debt” may well, it is 
suggested, refer to this shared compartment containing money had and received, debt and 
equitable liability for breach of trust transmuted to legal liability in debt – liability “in the 
nature of a debt or money had and received”, one might say. 
On the one hand, it meant liability exactly as a debt as much as money had and received is 
liability exactly as a debt – not at all, given it had to go through a fictitious implied promise to 
pay to get there. On the other, before modern times (specifically Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale 
Ltd where the defence of change of position was accepted),35 money had and received was also 
for a fixed sum. Attempts to import legal principles of quantification to indebitatus assumpsit 
were rejected; claims for unascertained sums (e.g. contractual damages, quantum meruit and 
quantum valebant), utilising legal principles such as causation, fell under the general assumpsit 
action.36 
The judges in Ex p. Adamson, James and Baggallay L.JJ., called in 1843 and 1831 
respectively,37 would have been well aware of the need to state the nature of the action on the 
writ because they would have been practising when it was necessary; while separate forms and 
procedures were abolished by the Uniformity of Process Act 1832, it was still necessary to 
state the nature of the action until the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 came into force, 
whereafter one could simply plead the facts that disclosed the cause of action. So, on the face 
of it, James and Baggallay L.JJ. were saying that such claims were for a fixed sum, not subject 
                                                 
33 Creggy [2016] EWCA Civ 1004; [2017] P.N.L.R. 4 at [53]. 
34 Libertarian Investments [2013] HKCFA 93, (2013) 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 681 at [168]. 
35 [1991] 2 A.C. 548. 
36 A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit (Oxford: 
Clarendon 1987) pp.496–7. 
37 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: OUP 2004). 
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to legal principles in quantification, because they had in mind the range of claims in indebitatus 
assumpsit. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that the restriction is entirely historic and has been rightly 
superseded. Money had and received is now restitution for unjust enrichment and, being subject 
to the defence – a legal principle – of change of position, is no longer for an ascertained sum, 
narrowly construed. It seems strange to look at related rules as they were at a certain point of 
time and derive a fixed principle from them, particularly given how the forms of action were 
manipulated to accommodate more and more claims in the distant past and how the claims 
deriving from them have been changed even more recently (viz. change of position). If other 
actions can move on, so can breach of trust. We should place more weight on the second 
sentence of the dictum where James and Baggallay L.JJ. spoke of the “value of the thing”. This 
points to the absence of consequential losses in the remedy. 
We should also look to other common factors in the class of actions falling within the old 
form of action, but with this in mind. Absence of consequential losses is, it is submitted, the 
apposite factor in what was indebitatus assumpsit. The present law of acknowledgement 
applies to the claims it does because of that common factor, albeit to a wider class than that in 
the 1888 Act. It can be justified because of the limited scope of enquiry in calculating quantum. 
It can be seen as fair to reset the limitation clock on acknowledgement of such sums, where it 
would be much harder on a defendant to do so upon the acknowledgement of a liability that 
might be swelled by consequential losses she is unaware of. Similarly, substitutive 
compensation should exclude consequential losses because the claimant does not need to plead 
or prove fault to obtain it. It the claimant wants to go harder on the defendant and claim 
consequential losses, she should have to plead and prove additional fault. 
Conclusion 
While the criticisms of Target Holdings and AIB that rely on Ex p. Adamson to argue that 
substitutive claims are for ascertained, fixed sums and are therefore not subject to causation 
gain a small fillip, it is submitted that this is besides the point. Reliance on Ex p. Adamson 
looks to a particular point in time and ignores the changes to the class of claims the dictum 
alluded to both before and after that point of time. Consequently one should dismiss such 
arguments. Legal principles have been admitted, for good reason, to substitutive compensation 
just as they were to restitution for unjust enrichment. 
One might wish to call substitutive compensation a “liquidated pecuniary claim”, but the 
phrase has been rendered ambiguous by its wide construction as applied to limitation. It is 
therefore better to characterise it as compensation for the value of property paid away without 
authorisation that excludes consequential losses, distinct from reparative compensation and 
distinct from simple restitution of the property’s value. This is because that is the logical 
progression from its historic origins and it is the right remedy for the circumstances. 
One might also note that while the reason for allowing acknowledgement to reset the 
limitation clock only for certain actions depends on the rule’s history, it might not justify it as 
a matter of first principles. One justification has been given, but again, that is a snapshot in 
time. The law moves on. Indeed, the next statutory tidying up exercise may well be to change 
the law of limitation so that acknowledgement applies to all claims, as the Law Commission 
  8 
suggests.38 The forms of action guide us and inform our understanding of the law, but should 
not rule us from their graves (with apologies to Maitland).39 
                                                 
38 Limitation of Actions (Law Com. No. 270, 2001), para.3.146–3.155. There was some dissent along the lines 
suggested above. 
39 See F.W. Maitland, Equity, also the Forms of Action at Common Law: Two Courses of Lectures (A.H. Chaytor 
and W.J. Whittaker eds, Cambridge: CUP, 1910) 372. 
